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Abstract—Modern critical infrastructures (e.g. Critical 
Energy Infrastructures) are increasingly evolving into complex 
and distributed networks of Cyber-Physical Systems. Although 
the cyber systems provide great flexibility in the operation of 
critical infrastructure, it also introduces additional security 
threats that need to be properly addressed during the design and 
development phase. In this landscape, resilience and robustness 
by design are becoming fundamental requirements. In order to 
achieve that, new approaches and technological solutions have to 
be developed that guarantee i) the fast incident/attack detection; 
and ii) the adoption of proper mitigation strategies that ensure 
the continuity of service from the infrastructure. The “Double 
Virtualization” emerged recently as a potential 
strategy/approach to ensure the robust and resilient design and 
management of critical energy infrastructures based on Cyber-
Physical Systems. The presented approach exploits the 
separation of the virtual capabilities/functionalities of a device 
from the physical system and/or platform used to run/execute 
them while allowing to dynamically (re-) configure the system in 
the presence of predicted and unpredicted incidents/accidents. 
Internet-based technologies are used for developing and 
deploying the envisioned approach. 
Keywords—Double virtualization; critical energy 
infrastructures; cyber-physical systems; resilience 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The evolution of critical infrastructures into complex 
distributed networks of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) has 
posed several challenges on how to monitor and control these 
systems [1]. The physical dimension of hardware components, 
and the cyber dimension of computations and communications 
are both susceptible to attacks that could potentially bring 
down the entire system [2]. This is particularly true in the 
Critical Energy Infrastructure (CEI) domain, characterized by 
vast, dispersed and heterogenous infrastructure of assets 
forming a multifaceted operational environment. 
To address these challenges, i.e. to facilitate the monitoring 
and control of this kind of infrastructures, smart grid concept 
has evolved. The smart grid deeply relies on the usage of 
communication and information technologies to enhance the 
control and monitoring of the grid, while providing a better 
“awareness” about the state of the grid [3], [4]. As stated in[3], 
smart grid incorporates several technical initiatives such as 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Wide-Area 
Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) systems 
based on Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) that are aiming to 
provide the guidelines and guidance on how to collect, 
transport, use and present data generated by the grid assets. 
Since these initiatives heavily rely on Information & 
Communication Technology (ICT) systems and, they are 
exposing the smart grid to a wide range of security threats and 
more in general to vulnerabilities that need to be managed to 
keep the system secure [5].  As a matter of fact, the 
proliferation of smart devices (and exploitation of cyber 
advances) can practically enable anyone to gain access and 
interact with the smart grid supporting infrastructure. As stated 
in [3], cyber-attacks can take many forms, depending on their 
objective and goal, while being distributed in location. All 
these aspects together make it nearly impossible to design and 
develop a “one-size fits all” approach that guarantees the 
security for every asset within the infrastructure. 
With this in mind, the main purpose of this paper is to 
present a specific strategy, approach and technological 
development – the so called “Double Virtualization” (DV) – to 
enable resilience and robustness of WAMPAC against cyber 
and physical attacks. Typically, system level control and 
monitoring functions of a smart grid are deployed in dedicated 
computational units. Any cyber-physical attacks on these 
dedicated computational units would compromise the complete 
operation of the smart grids. To deal with this situation and to 
minimize the effects of cyber-physical attacks a strategy is 
proposed that is built on top of cloud computing paradigm and 
– thus – based on the principle that monitoring and control 
capabilities/functionalities are logically separated from the 
hosting computational hardware and/or platform. In such a 
scenario, it will be possible to dynamically allocate/relocate 
virtual functionalities/capabilities to other similar 
computational hardware and/or platform under cyber-physical 
attacks. The proposed strategy does not contemplate the 
avoidance of cyber and physical attacks, on the contrary, it 
focus on their early detection and on defining the mechanisms 
that ensure continuous operation of a CEI (like the smart grid), 
by increasing the availability of the control and monitoring 
functions of the CEI that are re allocated in different hardware 
under any cyber-physical attacks. 
II. RELATED WORKS AND SUPPORTING CONCEPTS 
A. Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Grids 
Nowadays, the conventional systems and processes – in the 
most disparate context of application e.g. manufacturing, 
healthcare, automotive, smart grids, logistics etc. and different 
nature e.g. mechanical, electrical, and chemical – are evolving 
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into CPS. As stated in [6], the term “Cyber-Physical Systems” 
has been coined in 2006. Today, several definitions of CPS can 
be found in the literature. According to [7], CPS can be defined 
as transformative technologies that allow the management of 
physical assets and computational capabilities of 
interconnected systems. The definitions in [8], [9], highlight 
the concept of collaboration and service provisioning. As a 
matter of fact, CPS are defined as systems of collaborating 
computational entities that are strictly connected to the 
surrounding physical assets providing and using services 
to/from the internet. A working definition for CPS has been 
offered in [10], where a CPS is defined as a system consisting 
of computational, communication and control components 
combined with physical processes. Nowadays, CPSs are the 
foundation and the key element for smart grids. As a matter of 
fact, the two major elements of a smart grid are: the supporting 
infrastructure and the power application. In particular, the 
former is the one that delivers “smartness” to the grid and 
concerns with the integration of new technologies (cyber 
advances) and approaches for enhancing the monitoring and 
control activities of the operations within the grid. Therefore, 
Smart grids are opted as the application domain of the 
presented research, where securing are provisioning them with 
innovative mechanisms for responding to cyber physical 
attacks are actually the main objectives. 
B. Cyber-Physical Systems and Industry 
The research stream on CPS is extremely active and vibrant 
in the manufacturing domain as confirmed by the number of 
research activities on the topic. As a matter of fact, there is an 
extensive literature dealing with the materialization of the CPS 
vision and related challenges – technical, societal and 
educational – as confirmed in [11]. Modern production systems 
and their related control and monitoring solutions can be easily 
modelled as a network of interconnected and collaborative 
CPSs where communication takes place constantly both 
horizontally and vertically. However, the classical 
heterogeneity in equipment, encompassing distinct functions, 
form factors, network interfaces and I/O features supported by 
dissimilar software and hardware platforms is pushing for a 
new and well-defined strategy to increase the devices 
interoperability and agility performance [12]. It is necessary to 
comprehend that today's problem is no longer networking 
(protocols, connectivity, etc.) nor it is hardware (CPU/memory 
power is already there, at low-cost and low-power 
consumption) but rather it is on how to link disparate 
heterogeneous data sources to the specific needs and 
interaction forms of applications and platforms. In this scenario, 
the abstraction and/or virtualization of physical entities in 
terms of their functionalities – provided as services available 
over the network – is a necessary condition to ensure the 
creation of a highly dynamic and evolvable environment while 
detaching functionalities from the specific runtime, protocols 
and communication needs as confirmed in [13]–[16]. 
Furthermore, industrial initiatives such as the Reference 
Architectural Model for Industry 4.0 (RAMI 4.0) confirms the 
trend. In particular the Asset Administration Shell concept 
establishes the guidelines and methodology for industry 
digitization, i.e. for integrating industrial assets into I4.0 
communication backbone [17], [18]. Finally, the research 
performed by the authors in the manufacturing domain 
provided the foundation for the design and development of the 
proposed DV strategy. 
C. NIST Framework for Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
The NIST Framework for Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity [19] has been developed to deliver a systematic 
approach for managing cybersecurity-related risk that is 
aligned with the typical requirements of critical infrastructure 
providers [20]. The framework is built around five core 
concurrent and continuous functions, namely: i) Identify, 
ii) Protect, iii) Detect, iv) Respond, and v) Recover. These 
functions together allow organizations to express, in a high-
level strategic view, its management of the cybersecurity risk 
[19]. The NIST framework core elements provided the 
foundation for framing the application context, developing and 
implementing the necessary protection and detection 
mechanisms, as well as, the mitigation actions and recover 
strategies for robustness and resilience. 
D. Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control 
The WAMPAC leverages the PMUs and Phasor Data 
Concentrators (PDCs) to gain real-time awareness of the 
current state of the smart grid supporting infrastructure and 
related operations [21]. The WAMPAC can be further divided 
into three main components, namely: Wide-Area Monitoring 
Systems (WAMSs), Wide-Area Protection Systems (WAPs), 
and Wide-Area Control (WAC) [3]. The WAMPAC system 
provided the environment for the deployment of “Double 
Virtualization” services. In particular, some services have been 
developed [22] and later clustered under the name “Double 
Virtualization” and deployed in already existent WAMPAC to 
enhance the smart grid supporting infrastructure availability. 
E. The Observe-Orient-Decide and Act Pattern 
The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) pattern (see Fig. 
1), introduced by John Boyd[23], is a multi-staged approach to 
facilitate and speed-up the decision-making process. According 
to this pattern, the decision-making process occurs in a 
recurring cycle of four core stages, namely, the observe, orient, 
decide and act. The main objective is to deliver highly reactive 
and responsive systems that are capable to continuously adapt 
and evolve to changing and/or unpredictable circumstances. 
The OODA cycle has provided the foundation for the design of 
the overall DV strategy and related processes. In particular, the 
“Double Virtualization” strategy has been redefined and 
distilled around this cycle to encompass the OODA four 
interacting processes: 
 
Fig. 1. OODA Simple Loop. 
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• Observe: the stage where related sensorial data is 
gathered. Data is received from a variety of sources at 
each moment, which in DV translates to data incoming 
from all the connected devices. 
• Orient: DV handles the data to enrich it with meaning 
that is needed for further inspection: match the data to 
the respective device, comparison to previous stages, 
apply inspection algorithms and so on, in order to find 
meaningful flaws or deviations in the most efficient 
way. The observations made in this step shape the 
decisions and actions of the next iterations of the loop. 
• Decide: the input from the current orientation supplies 
the model with the possible paths and concludes for the 
most suitable to deliver (similar to a hypothesis, as 
referred by Boyd), therefore forming the plan to take 
into the next step. 
• Act: The DV system then executes the formerly defined 
plan, while maintaining track of the advances made and 
sending information back to observation, thus restarting 
the loop. 
F. Previous Research 
Traditionally the power grids have been operated using a 
centralized automation architecture where in the primary 
monitoring, control and protection algorithms run at a central 
server. The SCADA and WAMPAC systems provide the 
algorithms with the real time measurements and facilitate with 
the automation systems for real time control. Since the major 
intelligence for operation of the grid is deployed in a single 
server, it is always important to ensure continuous availability 
of the intelligence (algorithms) even under cyber-physical 
attacks on the device hosting them. Therefore in SUCCESS1 
[24] the concept of Double Virtualization has been introduced. 
Here DV is designed for virtualizing the monitoring, control 
and protection algorithms. Furthermore, these virtualized 
algorithms were moved from one device to another when a 
specific device hosting the algorithms failed under cyber-
physical attacks. A proof of concept implementation was then 
done based on CALVIN 2 Internet-of-Things (IoT) platform 
and presented in [22]. The study showed that CALVIN was a 
suitable platform for DV and that with DV the availability of 
the key automation functions was improved. However, usage 
of CALVIN confined the implementation of such automation 
functions to its own language, thus demanding considerable 
time to learn how to integrate them in its framework. Moreover, 
CALVIN does not provide an easy way to execute and control 
external computational processes, such as scripts or even the 
simple execution of terminal emulators, and it was found that 
CALVIN lacks on offering flexibility, security and scalability 
to larger systems and heavier functions. 
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. WAMPAC Architecture 
Fig. 2 shows a typical hierarchical WAMPAC architecture 
and communication layout together with the distinct computer 
1 https://success-energy.eu/ 
2 https://www.github.com/EricssonResearch/calvin-base 
layers (“cloud”, “fog”, “edge” and “device”). The state of the 
system is measured by PMUs. PMU measurements are 
collected and communicated to devices within the upper 
hierarchical levels of the architecture – called Phasor Data 
Concentrators (PDCs) –through high speed communication 
links (based on the IEEE C37.118.2 [25] standard for 
synchrophasor data transfer for power systems) to produce a 
real-time, time-aligned output data stream. PDCs can exchange 
phasor data with others PDCs. Finally, collected data are 
communicated to the WAMPAC control center where several 
potential applications are executed such as state estimation, 
model validation, early warning systems, etc. 
The networked and wide distribution nature of the 
WAMPAC architecture opens the doors to several 
vulnerabilities and/or possibility for cyber-attacks that can 
potentially affect the normal functioning of the system. It is 
necessary to design, develop and implement appropriate 
countermeasures to ensure the early detection and localization 
of those attacks while minimizing their impact on the system. 
B. Cyber Attack Classification, Vulnerabilities and Entry 
Points in WAMPAC 
The cyber-physical nature of a WAMPAC-based system 
implies that cyber-attacks can be easily directed to both 
power/physical and communication resources. Taking into 
account the WAMPAC environment, there are several relevant 
threats where the “Double Virtualization” approach/strategy 
can be applied as countermeasure, and that can be clustered 
according to [3] into three main groups, namely: i) Time-based 
attacks; ii) Integrity attacks; and iii) Reply attacks. However, in 
the context of the present research only time-based attacks 
have been considered, i.e. detectors have been implemented 
and “Double Virtualization” has been applied as a special 
measure to enhance availability and resilience of grid 
monitoring and control applications. 
In a time-based attack, the attacker tries to compromise the 
normal conditions and/or operations of the system by making a 
device, resource or service unavailable over the network. An 
example of this is the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. 
The DoS exploits communication vulnerabilities of CPS to 
inject false data with the objective of over-flooding the 
network. Furthermore, devices themselves are vulnerable to 
physical damage by malicious and/or accidental causes that can 
lead to the loss of all the critical data provided by that channel. 
 
Fig. 2. Typical WAMPAC Architecture. 
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As stated in [26], for each identified threat it is possible to 
model and identify an attack surface (see Fig. 3) with related 
multiple entry points. The attack surface allows to highlight the 
penetrable boundaries – i.e. the boundaries that an attacker can 
use to connect with – of the system under study as well as the 
internal path to critical resources. In the case of CPS entry 
points translate to: i) physical connections like cables, power 
sockets, etc., and ii) cyber connections like global accessible 
APIs, communication sockets, open ports, etc. These are also 
the boundaries that have been considered in the present work 
(see the yellow boxes in Fig. 3) as possible vulnerabilities and 
entry points that need to be properly handled by providing a 
strategy that allows monitoring and control functionalities to 
remain available even if devices are compromised in both 
physically and cyber dimensions. 
 
Fig. 3. Attack Surface, and Considered Entry Points, Adapted from [26]. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF DOUBLE VIRTUALIZATION 
A. Necessary Technologies for Double Virtualization 
1) Node-RED: The implementation of DV presented in 
this publication is supported by Node-RED 3  framework. 
Node-RED is a flow-based programming tool oriented to 
development of IoT applications, which provides an easy-to-
use browser-based graphical editor. Node-RED supplies a 
wide set of core Nodes, and possesses a big and highly active 
community that contributes with free-of-charge custom nodes. 
Furthermore, the panoply of exisitng features and nodes on 
Node-RED enable it to easily access terminal emulators, and 
therefore execute and manage running processes of the host 
machine. On the other hand, it also provides the development 
environment to establish connections to the running 
applications and processes, while also enabling their 
functionality extension as part of the embedded logic. This is 
one of the main reasons why this technology has been opted as 
the development and deployment framework for DV. 
Altogether, Node-RED has the potential to offer connectivity 
of several devices, by creating APIs and services supported on 
crossover environenments, using varied protocols and which 
can be easily deployed in its runtime. 
3 https://nodered.org/ 
2) PM2: PM24 is an advanced process manager oriented 
to Node.js applications, however, it has also the capability of 
managing other types of processes such as Bash or Python 
scripts and can be easily invoked by either the command line 
prompt or by embedding in any Node.js application such as 
Node-RED. 
B. Double Virtualization Architecture 
To integrate DV functionality and logic within an ordinary 
WAMPAC architecture and configuration, several components 
and related functionalities and interfaces have been designed 
and implemented. These functionalities have been deployed 
using the existing WAMPAC infrastructure, i.e. WAMPAC 
device platform, to equip current devices with the necessary 
logic for DV and to create two type of devices, namely: 
1) DV asset device: devices where the application layer, 
i.e. all the application running on the them, is/are virtualized 
in order to be easily managed by the DV components and 
logic (see Fig. 4); and. 
2) DV administration and management (DVA and M) 
device (see Fig. 5): devices that are logically settled at a 
higher level than the DV Asset devices and that are intended 
to run, manage and initiate the whole DV process by 
extracting, collecting and processing data provided by the DV 
Asset devices, in real time, as well as to execute the necessary 
actions according to the result of the data processing task. 
Both DV Asset and DVA&M devices are necessary for DV, 
i.e. the DV process and functionalities emerge as the result of 
the communication and interaction between these two types of 
devices. 
The research presented in this paper is intended to spotlight 
the DV concept and functionality by providing an example of 
application where DV Asset and DVA&M devices are used to 
deliver to WAMPAC system the capability of: 
1) detecting failures that compromise the availability of 
DV Asset devices; and 
2) mitigating detected failures to minimize their impact on 
the system. 
According to these objectives the architecture and system 
configuration presented in Fig. 6 have been implemented 
where a single DVA&M device and several DV Asset devices 
are employed to provide the necessary results. 
C. DV Asset device 
The DV Asset devices provide the following functionalities 
and/or services: 
• Virtualization service: it includes all the necessary 
mechanisms to enable the virtualization of device 
applications. Thus, it is responsible to create an 
abstraction layer that allows to separate device hosted 
applications from the specific hardware architecture 
while allowing these applications to be moved easily 
moved and interpreted by other DV Asset devices. 
4 https://pm2.keymetrics.io/ 
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Fig. 4. Computational Device “Enhanced” as DV Asset Device. 
 
Fig. 5. DV Administration and Management Device. 
 
Fig. 6. DV Architecture with a Single DVA and M Device. 
• DV API: it is an endpoint specifically created to allow 
DVA&M devices to remotely access the DV Asset 
devices for extracting and collecting the necessary 
information as well as for sending commands for 
triggering specific DV routines and actions (e.g. start, 
stop, reconfigure and/or move virtualized functions 
from one DV Asset to another). 
• Monitoring service: it provides the ability to the DV 
Asset device gather all the necessary information about 
the resources attached to it and related functionalities. 
Some gathered information include: network 
connection status, CPU and memory usage, as well as 
any change in the virtualized functions. As part of the 
Monitoring service there are: Heartbeat Service and 
Ping Service. Furthermore, Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) services could also be 
included to enable deeper monitoring capability of the 
DV Asset device. 
D. DV Administration and Management device 
The DVA&M device is then structured to comply with the 
OODA loop as a way to fulfill the goals proposed by the DV, 
and adopting the “enhanced” system with the Control loop 
depicted in Fig. 7. So, the DVA&M devices are provided with 
the following functionalities and/or services: 
• Persistence Service: it is a necessary condition for DV 
to have some type of database system for supporting 
registry functionality (e.g. register available DV Asset 
devices), as well as, storing temporary data necessary to 
run the DV logic. This service can be as simple as a file 
system or a more complex DB framework, either 
locally or remotely: 
• DVA&M Core: combination of the DV resources and 
functionalities that constantly uses the available set of 
information provided by the DV Asset devices and any 
other external data source if needed. The core features 
of the DVA&M have been divided in four distinct 
stages, namely: 
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1) Observing: The DV acquires data from connected 
devices installed on the sub-station through several pre-
defined connectors. The data can be obtained by using 
request/reply (e.g. Heartbeat, as used in the current 
implementation) or publish/subscription, or through the 
integration of connectors which may be implemented to cope 
with several protocols, as for example,  REST endpoints. 
Also, the sources of data are mainly composed by the DV 
Asset devices working in the subsystem under the supervision 
of the DVA&M device, however, it has also been implemented 
connectors that enabled the integration of external detectors, 
which by their turn, also send data related to DV Assets 
devices. 
2) Orienting: In this stage, each item of the received data 
is inspected through certain mechanisms, in order to be 
contextualized in respect to the system, so that possible 
scenarios can be envisioned. This means that for each 
incoming message, the content is deciphered in order to 
identify the source device and the type of information, 
compare it with previous stage, look for mismatching or 
unexpected values, and so on. This enables to identify if and 
which algorithms of the DV can possibly make use of the 
information to take some action. Through the help of 
dedicated observation services, sometimes it is easy for the 
DV to identify the type and source of the data. For example, 
receiving successful or failed heartbeat messages on dedicated 
HTTP(s) request will rapidly lead the DV to change the 
possible future scenario to take in consideration. 
3) Decision: The data and information provided by the 
Orientation stage are used during this stage by the DVA&M 
device to decide about DV actions, i.e. decisions computed 
during this stage are then translated into actions to be executed 
in the Acting stage. Moreover, decisions are made through 
algorithms that possess a configurable set of rules, limits and 
thresholds. Considering the former heartbeat example, 
depending on the configuration in use in the system, one 
failure message may be enough to activate a mitigation action, 
while on other system is may be needed two consecutive 
heartbeat failure messages. In the end of the stage, the possible 
decisions are: “no action”, or “start migration” to trigger the 
execution of a mitigation action that involves at least two DV 
Asset devices. The actors of the decision are also established 
during this stage.  
4) Acting: It is the practical execution of the decisions of 
the Decision stage, i.e. the decisions taken by the DVA&M 
device are translated into an action to take effect on DV Asset 
devices, if necessary. This is accomplished by establishing 
dedicated channels, which were designed as part of the DV 
communication and management features, for sending the 
necessary information and control data required by the 
involved DV Asset devices to execute the actions. Moreover, 
while actions are being deployed, the DVA&M device 
continuously observes the status of the operations while 
providing this information as internal feedback to the loop. 
 
Fig. 7. DV Control Flow Loop. 
V. APPLICATION SCENARIO AND RESULTS 
A. Exemplary Application Scenario 
A simple exemplary application scenario that involves the 
execution of a mitigation action – Migration – is described to 
show the potential of DV strategy. The scenario includes the 
following stages: 
a) Monitoring of DV Asset devices connectivity and 
detection of a connectivity. 
b) Deciding about the detected status of the DV Asset 
device, i.e. identify the best action to be taken (migration in 
the example) as well as the involved actors. 
c) Acting: the DV&AM device triggers the action by 
sending information to the involved DV Asset devices, while 
these execute the action according to the information received. 
The system configuration is based on the System Model 
presented in Section III, where PDC devices are connected to 
PMU devices that – in turn – are connected to a Real Time 
Digital Simulator (RTDS) to deliver measurement data to the 
PDC. PDC executes internal applications (simulation scripts) 
for collecting and processing data from the PMUs and data 
provisioning to the Control Center. All these components 
together represent a substation (Fig. 8). 
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Fig. 8. Simple Grid Monitoring use-case using PMU Measurements. 
In this scenario, PDC devices are “enhanced” with DV 
logic in order to act as DV Asset devices. Next to the PDC a 
DVA&M device is added to monitor and act on the DV Asset 
devices. At this point the initialization of the system can take 
place and DV Asset device applications and/or virtualized 
functionalities are communicated to the DVA&M together with 
connections details to enable the execution of the Monitoring 
services (Watchdog and Heartbeat services). A third DV Asset 
device is also included and used as “supporting” device during 
the execution of the migration action (see Fig. 9). Once 
initialized and all the conditions are settled, the DV logic can 
take place. 
Conceptually the OODA loop is executed by the overall 
system. In particular, the Observation stage runs with the DV 
Asset devices (i.e. “enhanced” PDC) that use the internal 
Heartbeat service to communicate their connectivity status. 
The status is monitored by the DVA&M device that in turn uses 
the Watchdog internal service for detecting any connectivity 
failure of the related DV Asset devices. At some point in time a 
connectivity failure (connection timeouts, communication 
delays, etc.) of a specific DV Asset device is detected by the 
DVA&M device, the Decision stage can start. During this stage, 
the DVA&M is responsible for deciding the most suitable 
mitigation action and, in particular, to start the migration 
process which involves the following steps: 
1) Identification of the best suitable DV Asset device that 
can host the virtualized functions of the faulty DV Asset 
device; 
2) Move the virtualized functions of the faulty DV Asset 
device to the new selected DV Asset device; and. 
3) Track the migration process while keeping updated the 
tasks of the Observation stage. 
In the current scenario the system configuration evolves 
from the one depicted in Fig. 9 to a newer configuration (see 
Fig. 10), where the “supporting” DV Asset device is now 
running the virtualized functionalities of the faulty DV Asset 
device, i.e. it shows the same behavior of the faulty DV Asset 
device. 
 
Fig. 9. Grid Monitoring use-case using PMU Measurements with DV 
Components Integrated. 
 
Fig. 10. System State after Migration Process Triggered by a Faulty 
Connection. 
B. Results and Discussion 
To measure and quantify the impact DV strategy has in the 
normal operation of the system the following metrics are 
considered: 
• The time instant a connectivity failure is detected by the 
DVA&M device by using the internal Watchdog service. 
• The time instant a decision is taken by the DVA&M 
device, i.e. a suitable DV Asset device is identified and 
all the virtualized functions of the faulty device are 
ready to be moved. 
• The time instant the action is practically executed by the 
DVA&M device, i.e. the DVA&M device connects to the 
selected DV Asset device (through the DV API) and 
send the virtualized functions and configurations. 
• The time instant the action is concluded, i.e. when a 
notification is received by the DV Asset device. 
These time instants are shown in Table I, where each row 
identifies the execution of a migration action. 
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TABLE I. TIMESTAMPS RELATED TO THE DV AND AM MITIGATIN 
PROCESS 
detection decision action mitigation end 
1578421500738 1578421500740 1578421500744 1578421501216 
1578422203744 1578422203746 1578422203750 1578422204211 
1578422358906 1578422358907 1578422358912 1578422359369 
1578423527297 1578423527298 1578423527301 1578423527758 
1578423642621 1578423642624 1578423642627 1578423643088 
1578423779547 1578423779547 1578423779549 1578423779906 
1578423886704 1578423886705 1578423886709 1578423887170 
1578424038372 1578424038374 1578424038377 1578424038842 
1578424374310 1578424374312 1578424374316 1578424374779 
1578424506782 1578424506783 1578424506789 1578424507247 
From the values of Table I, it is possible to determine the 
time consumed on the distinct stages, once a failure is detected 
(i.e. decision, action preparation and execution times), as well 
as, the total time consumed, from the detection to the end of the 
mitigation action. These times are shown in Table II. 
The values show an extremely reactive system, where the 
decision and action preparation times are less than 10ms. On 
the contrary the action execution time is where the system 
consumes most of the total time. This time consumed is mainly 
due to the technological constrains (REST connections and 
implemented interaction protocols). However, the total time 
needed for a complex mitigation action is still on the order of 
milliseconds. Finally, during the execution of a mitigation 
action (in the example migration) there is always some data 
that is lost. This loss of data is directly related to the time 
needed for executing the mitigation action (in the example the 
mean time of 457ms as shown in Table II). It is possible to 
quantify the loss of data too by considering that PMUs devices 
publish measurements each 20ms or in other words with a 50 
frames per second rate. Therefore, by capturing the time instant 
of the last data frame received by the DV Asset device before 
the connectivity fault and the time instant of the first data 
frame after the migration action is executed the loss of data can 
be estimated (see Table III). 

















  2 4 472 478 
  2 4 461 467 
  1 5 457 463 
  1 3 457 461 
  3 3 461 467 
  0 2 357 359 
  1 4 461 466 
  2 3 465 470 
  2 4 463 469 
  1 6 458 465 
Mean 2 4 451 457 
TABLE III. TIME ELAPSED OF DATA FRAMES ACQUIRED BETWEEN 
FAULTY AND NEW DEVICE 
  
timestamp from 
last frame before 
fault  
Timestamp from 







  1578421501400 1578421500540 860 43 
  1578422204400 1578422203600 800 40 
  1578422359560 1578422358700 860 43 
  1578423527940 1578423527100 840 42 
  1578423643280 1578423642480 800 40 
  1578423780100 1578423779320 780 39 
  1578423887360 1578423886540 820 41 
  1578424039000 1578424038200 800 40 
  1578424374960 1578424374100 860 43 
  1578424507420 1578424506620 800 40 
Mean     822 41 
Finally, in Table IV, the approximated time consumed 
during the deployment, initialization, and configuration of the 
migrated functionalities in the new DV Asset device is given. 
This time is calculated by correlating the values gathered from 
the previous tables. 
TABLE IV. APPROXIMATION OF DV ASSET DEVICE TIME ELAPSED WHILE 










Approximated time of 
processing and initializing 
received flows on the DV Asset 
device 
(ms) 
  478 860 382 
  467 800 333 
  463 860 397 
  461 840 379 
  467 800 333 
  359 780 421 
  466 820 354 
  470 800 330 
  469 860 391 
  465 800 335 
Mean 457 822 366 
The approximated time of processing and initializing flows 
on the DV Asset device strictly depends on the technology 
chosen and on technological constraints (such as type of 
communication channels and interaction protocols), and, thus, 
this is the first parameter the authors are working on for DV 
strategy performance improvement. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
In this paper the authors analyzed the importance of 
WAMPAC to gain a real-time awareness of the current state of 
the smart grid while ensuring the correct operation. Securing 
WAMPAC is – thus – a key priority. In this landscape, the 
authors presented a new and improved technological 
environment for developing and deploying the novel 
approach/strategy – i.e. “Double Virtualization” – to ensure the 
robust and resilient design and management of critical energy 
infrastructures based on CPSs. The proposed approach/strategy 
deeply relies on current trends in internet technologies and 
advanced computing technique where virtualization of the 
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resources is demanded. Furthermore, the evolution of current 
systems and processes into networks of CPS, and the related 
separation between “cyber” and “physical” dimensions creates 
the foundations for “Double Virtualization”. As a matter of fact, 
this separation allows the creation of a highly dynamic and 
evolvable environment where functionalities (that lives in the 
“cyber” dimension) are detached from the specific runtime, 
protocols and communication needs. By appropriately 
exposing WAMPAC physical devices (PDCs) in terms of their 
functionalities it is possible to migrate functionalities from one 
device to another in the presence of cyber-attacks. Finally, the 
paper provides an exemplary application scenario to validate 
the proposed approach/strategy while summarizing how cyber-
attacks on WAMPAC can trigger mitigation actions consisting 
in the migration of the functionalities from one runtime to 
another. However, further experiments need to be conducted to 
optimize the “Double Virtualization” i.e. optimization of the 
mitigation strategies, new monitoring algorithms for detecting 
abnormal behaviors and cyber-attacks within WAMPAC, 
integration of multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
algorithms to expand and improve decision agility, and 
investigate a distributed management strategy to handle any 
failure of the DVA&M component. 
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